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Abstract: This study examines the impact of court-ordered finance reform in New York 
State resulting from Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York on equity of inputs using 
synthetic controls. The findings herein indicate court mandated education finance reform 
in New York had little to no impact on equity of educational inputs despite an overhauled 
education finance system intending to distribute more state funding based on student 
need. In the period during and following the Great Recession, the State of New York 
chose to cut districts’ foundation aid, a form of aid designed to be distributed 
progressively, halting any improvement in equity. Had funding been distributed to districts 
according to the foundation formula that was specified by the education finance reform 
legislation passed in 2007, high poverty districts would have received more funding and 
disparities in funding across districts with similar characteristics would have been reduced. 
I also show that other forms of aid, which are regressively distributed, could have been cut 
instead of foundation aid, allowing for more funding to flow to high poverty districts in a 
time of fiscal constraint. 
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La equidad olvidada: La promesa y el posterior desmantelamiento de la reforma 
financiera de la educación en el estado de Nueva York 
Resumen: Este estudio examina el impacto de la reforma financiera ordenada por la corte 
en el estado de Nueva York como resultado de la Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New 
York sobre la equidad de los insumos que utilizan controles sintéticos. Los hallazgos en 
este documento indican que la reforma del financiamiento de la educación ordenada por el 
tribunal en Nueva York tuvo poco o ningún impacto en la equidad de los aportes 
educativos a pesar de un sistema revisado de financiamiento de la educación con la 
intención de distribuir más fondos estatales en función de las necesidades de los 
estudiantes. En el período durante y después de la Gran Recesión, el Estado de Nueva 
York decidió recortar la ayuda de la fundación de los distritos, una forma de ayuda 
diseñada para distribuirse progresivamente, deteniendo cualquier mejora en la equidad. Si 
los fondos se hubieran distribuido a los distritos de acuerdo con la fórmula básica 
especificada por la legislación de reforma del financiamiento de la educación aprobada en 
2007, los distritos de alta pobreza habrían recibido más fondos y las disparidades en los 
fondos entre los distritos con características similares se habrían reducido. También 
muestro que otras formas de ayuda, que se distribuyen de forma regresiva, podrían haberse 
reducido en lugar de la ayuda de la fundación, permitiendo que más fondos fluyan a los 
distritos de alta pobreza en un momento de restricción fiscal. 
Palabras-clave: equidad; financiación de la educación; reforma financiera 
 
Equidade esquecida: A promessa e subsequente desmantelamento da reforma do 
financiamento da educação no Estado de Nova York 
Resumo: Este estudo examina o impacto da reforma financeira ordenada por tribunais no 
Estado de Nova York resultante da Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York na 
eqüidade de insumos usando controles sintéticos. As descobertas aqui indicadas indicam 
que a reforma do financiamento educacional ordenada por tribunais em Nova York teve 
pouco ou nenhum impacto na equidade dos insumos educacionais, apesar de um sistema 
financeiro reformulado pretender distribuir mais fundos estatais com base nas 
necessidades dos alunos. No período durante e após a Grande Recessão, o Estado de 
Nova York optou por cortar a ajuda básica dos distritos, uma forma de ajuda projetada 
para ser distribuída progressivamente, interrompendo qualquer melhoria no patrimônio. Se 
o financiamento fosse distribuído aos distritos de acordo com a fórmula da fundação 
especificada pela legislação de reforma do financiamento da educação aprovada em 2007, 
os distritos de alta pobreza teriam recebido mais recursos e as disparidades de 
financiamento entre os distritos com características semelhantes teriam sido reduzidas. 
Também mostro que outras formas de ajuda, que são distribuídas regressivamente, 
poderiam ter sido cortadas em vez da ajuda básica, permitindo que mais fundos fluíssem 
para os distritos de alta pobreza em um momento de restrição fiscal. 
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Introduction 
In 2003, and again in 2006, the court system of New York, in the cases making up Campaign 
for Fiscal Equity v. The State of New York (CFE v. State of New York), found the state was not fulfilling 
its obligation of providing a “sound basic education.”1 As a result, the court directed the State of 
New York to fix an education funding system that was not sufficiently addressing the needs of 
students, particularly in New York City Public Schools. This study examines the impact of the two 
CFE v. New York court cases and the subsequent school finance reform on the distribution of 
spending and revenue across districts in the State of New York. 
School finance reform is one of the primary tools used by policy makers to improve 
educational equity and is often the result of state court system rulings that find state funding policies 
to be unconstitutional. As of 2018, 22 states have had plaintiff victories in the respective state’s 
highest court indicating an unconstitutional system of funding schools and five states have had 
mixed results meaning they have had both plaintiff and state victories (SchoolFunding.Info, 2018). 
However, not all court cases that overturn the state system of school funding lead to meaningful 
changes in the education finance system. Baker (2018, p. 81) states, “we must closely scrutinize 
whether substantive reform actually happened by measuring and tracking sufficiently precise 
indicators of the reforms.” 
Early court cases involving school funding generally focused on equal protection, and 
therefore focused on eliminating disparities in funding across districts. In recent cases, including 
CFE v. New York, systems of education funding have usually been found to violate state 
constitutional clauses guaranteeing some minimum level of quality or fairness in the state education 
system (Koski & Hahnel, 2015; Rebell, 2009).2 Every state constitution guarantees the right to 
receive an education with variations regarding whether there is also some guarantee regarding the 
quality of the education states are expected to provide. For example, New York’s constitution only 
requires the state to maintain “free common schools” while the language in the constitutions of 
states like Florida and Illinois require high quality schools (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). State 
constitutional requirements to provide education create the opportunity to challenge within state 
courts perceived and actual unfairness in education funding practices placing certain individuals or 
groups at an educational disadvantage. 
The shift since the late 1980s away from equity-based challenges of state education systems 
toward adequacy-based ones has transpired for several reasons. First, adequacy-based challenges of 
state education funding are more palatable to a wider range of constituents. In equity decisions the 
goal is to reduce variation in spending among districts. As a result, in instances where educational 
funds are not increased, there are districts who are winners and ones who are losers. Additionally, 
the restricting of local revenue can reduce commitment to local public schools and diminish the 
 
1 The phrase “sound basic education” is not the language used in the New York constitution, but is instead 
the interpretation of the state's constitutional obligation based on an earlier state court case, Levittown Union 
Free School District v. Nyquist in 1982 (Williams, 2007). 
2 Education finance litigation has largely been described as occurring in three waves. Under the first wave, 
cases focused on equity under the federal constitution's Equal Protection Clause. However, this strategy was 
invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez in 1973. The second 
wave continued to focus on equity but relied on state constitutions. These cases were largely unsuccessful 
with plaintiffs prevailing in only 7 of 22 second wave cases (Koski & Hahnel, 2015). Collectively, cases in the 
first two waves were “equity” cases. The third wave continued to use state constitutions but focused on 
educational quality rather than equality of funding. These cases focused on educational quality are known as 
“adequacy” cases (Conley, 2003; Koski & Hahnel, 2015; Koski & Reich, 2006). 
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willingness of residents to raise taxes (Hanushek & Lindseth, 2009). In contrast, adequacy-based 
decisions do not necessarily have winners and losers as it does not call for reduced variation in 
funding at the expense of high spending districts. Instead adequacy rulings call for increased 
investment in education, particularly for low-spending high-poverty districts, often with no penalty 
for spending more than what is deemed adequate. As such, adequacy-based decisions are seen as less 
of an infringement on local control compared to equity-based decisions (Heise, 1995). A second 
reason for increased prevalence of adequacy rulings is the increased use of standards and assessment 
to test the achievement of students starting in the early 1990s (Clune, 1994; Rebell, 2009). With the 
advent of standards and assessments, goals were set for what students should know and be able to 
do, and students were tested to determine whether they achieved the set proficiency targets. Setting 
standards and testing students annually generated new evidence demonstrating the inadequacy of 
education received by students, particularly those from disadvantaged populations (Koski & Hahnel, 
2015). 
The issue in these “adequacy” cases is the poor quality of education provided to certain 
students, particularly those in persistently low performing districts and schools, rather than the 
degree to which disparities in funding exist between districts. The districts that are the focus of these 
court cases often serve poor and otherwise disadvantaged students and lack resources to 
appropriately serve their student population. In contrast, higher performing districts are often well 
funded and enroll students from families with higher incomes. Adequacy is typically measured in 
terms of whether levels of funding are sufficient for students to achieve states’ outcome goals (Baker 
& Green, 2015). Therefore, although the goal under adequacy cases is a higher quality education, 
calls for more money and resources have often been the prescribed remedy (Hanushek & Lindseth, 
2009; Williams, 2007). The idea of adequacy allowed reformers to more clearly tie student outcomes 
to the amount of funding and resources received by students within state education systems. 
While equity may not be the primary consideration in adequacy cases, Chambers & Levin 
(2009) argue adequacy of educational resources cannot be achieved without an equitable distribution 
of resources. Additionally, Baker (2018) describes a progressive view of adequacy as providing 
funding at a sufficient level and provided in a way to ensure students regardless of background have 
the supports they need to achieve state mandated outcomes. In other words, students with higher 
needs require more resources. Over time the framing of equity has shifted from a focus on equality 
of inputs to a focus on outcomes (Baker & Green, 2015; Koski & Hahnel, 2015). It is broadly 
accepted that in order to provide students equal opportunity to achieve a set of outcomes, 
differentiation of inputs is required (Baker, 2018). This differentiation of inputs, where students with 
more needs receive more resources, is a signal of a progressive or vertically equitable system of 
education funding (Berne & Stiefel,1984). 
Prior Studies of the Impact of Education Finance Reform 
 Several studies have examined the impact of school finance reform nationally and have 
found finance reform to significantly increase equity of inputs and, in particular, boost spending in 
previously low spending and high poverty districts (Candelaria & Shores, 2019; Card & Payne, 2002; 
Corcoran & Evans, 2008, 2015; Jackson, 2018; Jackson, Johnson & Persico, 2016; Lafortune, 
Rothstein & Schanzenbach, 2018). Additionally, Jackson et al. (2016) found different responses to 
equity and adequacy-based rulings with equity cases leading to improved levels of equity of inputs 
without increasing overall levels of spending, and adequacy cases increasing spending particularly in 
previously lower spending and higher poverty school districts, thereby improving equity. However, 
these national studies only describe the average impact on equity from school finance reform. The 
impact of finance reform varies significantly by state often based on the level of cooperation 
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between the courts ordering the change in funding and the state legislature ultimately responsible for 
passing legislation to enact the change in funding (Yinger, 2004). 
While generally, research has shown school finance reform to improve equity of inputs, one 
of the criticisms of school finance reform—particularly those involving significant increases in 
spending—is the opaque link between spending levels and educational outcomes. Hanushek & 
Lindseth (2009) argue the increases in spending resulting from adequacy rulings have generally not 
resulted in significant achievement gains. However, several studies have shown school finance 
reform does impact outcomes. In national studies, Jackson et al. (2016) found increases in spending 
from school finance reform resulted in more years of school completed, increased adult earnings, 
and reduced adult poverty rates; Lafortune et al. (2018) found a decrease in the relationship between 
poverty levels and student performance between districts after finance reform; Card & Payne (2002) 
found equalization of spending following education finance reform resulted in a narrowing of the 
achievement gap on the SAT between children of highly educated and uneducated parents by about 
5% in addition to increasing the incidence rate of taking the SAT among students from more 
disadvantaged family backgrounds; and Candelaria & Shores (2019) found that high-poverty districts 
in states undergoing education finance reform improved graduation rates relative to states that did 
not undergo finance reform. 
While there is growing evidence that education finance reform has the ability to impact both 
equity of educational inputs and outcomes, it is essential to continue to evaluate the effectiveness of 
education finance reform, and in particular court-ordered education finance reform, as a tool to 
improve educational equity. Court-ordered education finance reform is unique to legislative action 
or ballot initiatives, in that the court system does not have the power to pass laws or set state 
budgets; therefore, while courts can decide that the state education system is deficient, it does not 
have the ability to act directly to address the deficiencies. The courts instead task the legislative 
bodies to come up with a solution to satisfy the states’ educational obligations. Therefore, court-
ordered finance reform is a two-step process, with the first step being the court ruling, and the 
second step being corrective legislative action. Often, the assumption is that legal action will 
necessarily lead to legislative action. 
The Current Study 
In this study, I examine the impact of a specific series of court cases—the two CFE v. State 
of New York rulings in 2003 and 2006—on the equity of resource distribution across districts. 
Although these court cases were ruled on the basis of adequacy, prior adequacy-based court cases 
have been shown to meaningfully improve the equity of resource distribution across districts 
(Candelaria & Shores, 2019; Lafortune et al., 2018). Using a comparative case study methodology 
known as synthetic controls, this study provides an example where the court-ordered reform 
ultimately did not result in meaningful action to improve equity of educational resources. While the 
proposed legislative solution was slow to come, the legislated changes to the funding formula would 
have generated substantial improvements to the equity of funding in New York had they been 
implemented as intended. The resulting finance reform in New York intended to ramp up funding 
based on student needs over the course of several years. However, the great recession led to a halt 
on increases in state funding. The freezes and cuts put in place meant that equity of education inputs 
in New York changed little, if at all, as a result of the CFE v. New York court cases. The state chose 
to place freezes and cuts on foundation aid, a form of state aid distributed progressively according to 
student need. The state could have chosen instead to make cuts to a regressive form of funding, 
which provides property tax relief to districts. In the years subsequent to the freezes on state aid, 
school districts increased their rates of local effort and the state most heavily subsidized increases to 
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local revenue for districts with the smallest shares of students in poverty through its system of 
property tax relief. The resulting effect was a system of school funding which remained regressive 
and maintained large funding discrepancies between districts. The lessons learned from this case 
study provide the State of New York actionable steps to improve its fairness of funding education 
and serve as an example to other states of the consequences of failing to prioritize equity, 
particularly in times of fiscal constraint. 
The Court Case and the State Response 
In 1993, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity challenged New York State's system of school 
funding. In particular, the challenge alleged that New York City’s schools were underfunded, and 
therefore, the state was not upholding its obligation to provide a sound basic education to the 
students of New York City (Rebell, 2011). The resulting court case, Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. The 
State of New York (CFE I), was decided a decade later in June, 2003. The case found for the plaintiffs 
and overturned the education finance system in New York on the basis that it was not providing all 
students an adequate education. The ruling required the state to conduct an analysis to determine the 
cost of providing students in New York City a basic education. The court rejected the former notion 
that a sound basic education meant achieving an eighth-grade level, with the understanding that a 
high school education is a minimum requirement for success in today's society (Rebell, 2011). The 
Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, set a deadline of July 30, 2004, to implement 
reforms that would ensure the adequacy of schools in New York City (CFE v. State of New York, 
2003). 
In response, a commission was created by Governor George Pataki and chaired by Frank G. 
Zarb, known as the Zarb Commission, to determine how much additional funding New York City 
schools would require to attain the level of adequacy specified by the courts. The Zarb Commission 
hired Standard and Poor's (S&P) School Evaluation Services to conduct an adequacy study (CFE v. 
State of New York, 2006). The Zarb Commission used a “successful schools” approach to 
determine the cost of a good education by identifying the set of schools considered to be high 
achieving, discarding the top half of those schools based on per-pupil expenditures, and determining 
how much on average the bottom half of successful schools spent on education. Based on a review 
of literature, the Commission determined weights for students in various categories of disadvantage, 
applying a weight of 2.1 for students with disabilities, 1.35 for economically disadvantaged students, 
and 1.2 for English language learners. In addition, two different ways of adjusting for geographic 
cost differences were factored in and were compared (CFE v. State of New York, 2006). Using these 
methods, the Zarb Commission indicated New York City should spend a minimum of $1.93 billion 
more than what they had been spending per school year for operating expenses. The commission 
also indicated a statewide spending deficit of at least $2.45 billion dollars. 
Following the findings of the Zarb commission, several proposals that endorsed the 
recommendations and even exceeded the minimum recommended increase in funding were put 
before the state legislature. The proposed legislation was ultimately not enacted and instead a bill 
was passed in August, 2004 providing only $300 million in aid to New York City schools (CFE v. 
State of New York, 2006). 
Following the July 30, 2004 deadline imposed by the New York Court of Appeals in the 
2003 decision, the court began its evaluation of whether the State of New York had fulfilled its 
constitutional obligations. A panel was created to conduct hearings and make recommendations 
regarding whether the state had met those obligations. Based on the information given to the panel, 
which included the findings of the Zarb Commission as well as several other cost analysis studies, 
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the panel concluded that the initial recommendation of $1.93 billion increase in aid was insufficient. 
The panel concluded that the appropriate weight for economically disadvantaged students was 1.5 
rather than 1.35; they accepted the “successful schools” approach but rejected the use of only 
successful schools in the bottom half of spending; and the panel applied an up-to-date geographic 
cost index. Based on these modifications, the panel determined the appropriate increase in funding 
for New York City to be $5.63 billion dollars. Furthermore, because that figure only represented 
operational expenditures and not those for capital improvements, the panel made an additional 
recommendation to appropriate $9 billion for school facilities improvement over a five-year period. 
The New York Court of Appeals accepted these recommendations, which the state then appealed 
(Rebell, 2011). 
As a result of the appeal the case ended up back in the New York Court of Appeals, and was 
decided in November, 2006. In the 2006 decision (CFE II) the Court of Appeals found that the 
court had erred in 2004 when it commissioned its own study of the appropriate amount of funding 
owed to New York City, and therefore should not have rejected the proposed increase in funding of 
$1.93 billion for New York City schools. However, regardless of whether the increase in funding 
should have been $1.93 or $5.63 billion, the state had not met its obligation in meeting the necessary 
increase in aid. Furthermore, while not requiring a statewide solution to funding, the court 
encouraged a more comprehensive statewide approach to addressing education funding within the 
state (CFE v. State of New York, 2006). 
In response, the state legislature and executive passed a comprehensive set of education 
finance reforms in 2007 that changed how state aid was calculated by consolidating many separate 
funding programs into a single formula for calculating foundation aid, applying more appropriate 
weights to the calculated foundation aid to account for different categories of student need, and 
providing $5.5 billion in additional state aid to be phased in over a four-year period (Rebell, 2011; 
Yinger, 2013). Because of these reforms, by 2011 the highest need districts were supposed to have 
received more than $9,500 per student in state aid compared to less than $2,700 in the lowest need 
districts (Baker, 2014). 
During the first two years after enactment of the new foundation formula, state aid increased 
by $2.1 billion of the total $5.5 billion increase (Rebell, 2011). However, during the school years 
ending in 2010 and 2011 the state legislature froze increases in state foundation aid funding and 
made additional cuts to state aid in the 2010–11 school year due to the Great Recession (Rebell, 
2011; Yinger, 2013). State aid remained largely unchanged once again during the school years ending 
in 2012 and 2013. Yinger (2013) indicated the freezes and cuts in state aid had a much larger impact 
on the districts serving the most disadvantaged students due to stronger reliance on state aid 
compared to wealthier districts. In addition, Chakrabarti, Livingston & Roy (2014) found that high 
wealth districts increased property tax rates to a greater extent as a response to state cuts in aid 
compared to low wealth districts, further exacerbating the inequities generated by cuts in state aid. 
How Schools Are Funded in the State of New York 
Prior to the 2007–08 school year, the funding system of New York contained numerous 
individual grants with some effort to equalize amounts based on student needs and district wealth. 
Jackson, Johnson & Persico (2014) categorized the funding system during this time as a flat grant 
system with equalization plans. Several grants were used to provide state aid to districts for their 
operating expenditures including formula operating aid, flex aid, and sound basic education aid, as 
well as a number of supplemental funding streams for students in poverty, English learners, 
providing prekindergarten education, in addition to a number of other categorical funding streams 
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(New York State Education Department, 2006b). Under this formula, state aid was designed to be 
distributed more strongly to low-wealth districts who generate less local revenue per student. During 
the 2003–04 school year the lowest wealth districts received close to six times more state aid per 
student than the highest wealth districts. However, this attempt at equalization through state aid was 
not enough to offset differences in local revenue where high wealth districts generated more than 
nine times the local revenue compared to low wealth districts while often imposing lower tax rates 
(New York State Education Department, 2006a). 
While the narrative of the response to court-ordered finance reform makes it seem like little 
was done to address inequity until 2007 when there were major changes to the state funding system, 
from 2004–05 to 2006–07 the state budget for general public school support increased from $15.3 
billion (New York State Education Department, 2004) to $17.7 billion (New York State Education 
Department, 2006a), an increase of more than 15%. However, during this time revenue from local 
funding sources increased at an even greater rate resulting in a decreased share of funding from state 
aid. 
In 2007, as part of the State Budget and Reform Act of 2007, a new education funding 
formula was enacted to calculate school districts' general operating aid (Rebell, 2011). The new 
formula, which went into effect beginning with the 2007–08 school year, was a foundation formula 
in which the state was to determine the minimum expense per pupil for each school district called 
the adjusted foundation amount, specify the minimum local contribution per pupil, and pay the 
remaining balance (New York State Education Department, 2007). The adjusted foundation amount 
was intended to vary by school district according to a regional cost index and a pupil need index that 
accounts for student poverty, students receiving services for limited English proficiency, and district 
sparsity. The minimum local contribution varied with district wealth with those with higher property 
wealth paying more than those with lower property wealth. The formula also included weights for 
students with disabilities. Under the new foundation formula, the numerous grants supporting 
operational expenditures under the former funding system were combined into the foundation aid 
amount. In addition, as mentioned above, state aid was intended to increase $5.5 billion over a four-
year period. State aid increased by $1.7 billion for the 2007–08 school year and by an additional $1.7 
billion for the 2008–09 school year including additional amounts to the foundation aid. In the 2009–
10 school year state aid increased by $405 million and a freeze was placed on foundation aid. For 
school years ending in 2011 and 2012 significant cuts were made to state aid, which were termed the 
gap elimination adjustment, to balance the state budget (New York State Education Department, 
2013). By the 2011–12 school year state aid constituted less than 40% of the state education budget, 
down from almost 47% in the 2008–09 school year (New York State Education Department, 2009, 
2012). Yinger (2013) indicated the cuts undid much of the improvements the reforms made to the 
education funding system since 2007. 
The foundation formula—the largest piece of state aid in New York—does not make up the 
entirety of state spending on education. One of the additional categories of state revenue is School 
Tax Relief (STAR), which is a homestead tax exemption program that allocates state revenue to 
school districts to offset lower property tax rates. STAR was first implemented during the 1998–99 
school year (New York State Education Department, 2006b) and was fully implemented in the 
2001–02 school year (Yinger, 2013). Under STAR all home owners receive some property tax relief. 
Unlike other forms of state aid, STAR is not equalized by district wealth. In many of the neediest 
districts the residents are more often renters rather than home-owners. Because STAR only applies 
to owner-occupied primary residences, high-need school districts with large proportions of renters 
do not receive the benefits of the STAR program to the same degree as wealthier school districts 
(Eom, Duncombe, Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger, 2014; Eom & Killeen, 2007). In the 2009–10 school 
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year, the wealthiest districts received more than $1,500 per pupil in STAR, while the poorest districts 
received less than $1,000 on average (Baker & Corcoran, 2012). Furthermore, according to 
Chakrabarti et al. (2014) the cuts in state aid at the time of the Great Recession disproportionately 
impacted low wealth districts in part because the STAR system of property tax relief enabled the 
high wealth districts, which received more tax relief, to increase property tax rates to a greater degree 
than districts with lower wealth residents. Increased local tax rates combined with higher property 
wealth allowed wealthier districts to leverage STAR to increase local revenue more than lower-
wealth districts post-recession. 
Research Question and Purpose 
The research question in this study is: Has court-ordered finance reform in New York impacted equity 
of educational inputs? In this study I examine two aspects of equity. First, I evaluate the progressiveness 
of funding, defined as the distribution of funding according to poverty. Second, I assess the 
dispersion in funding levels across districts with similar student needs and structural characteristics. I 
measured dispersion as the average distance between observed and expected levels of funding. 
I address the research question in two ways. First, I examine changes of equity over time in 
New York compared to other similar states to see if patterns in equity levels changed substantially 
after the CFE v. New York court cases. To conduct this analysis, I used other states that did not 
have education finance reform in the same period to construct a control case to serve as a plausible 
counterfactual for what would have happened in New York had court-mandated education finance 
reform not occurred. The control case serves as a baseline for understanding the magnitude of 
changes seen in New York. Second, I attempt to better understand the patterns of change over time 
within the context of fiscal constraints and underfunding of the proposed education finance reform 
policies imposed by the Great Recession. To do so, I conducted simulations to understand how 
equity might have changed in the absence of freezes and cuts to state aid that occurred during the 
Great Recession. By addressing the research question in this way, I show whether equity of inputs 
improved over time, whether any changes in equity can reasonably be attributed to education 
finance reform resulting from the CFE v. New York case, and how choices to freeze and 
subsequently make cuts to foundation aid during the Great Recession affected equity in the period 
subsequent to the Great Recession. 
Methods and Data 
This study builds upon previous analyses of New York's education finance system through 
three separate tasks. First, I measured equity in New York over time in several different ways—
namely the progressiveness and amount of dispersion in spending and revenue across districts—to 
observe whether there were significant changes pre- to post-reform. Second, I determined whether 
changes in levels of equity seen in New York after the court-ordered education finance reform were 
substantial and meaningful. To do so, I compared equity levels in New York to control cases made 
up from other states that did not have education finance reform during the same period. Third, I 
examined the impacts of the freezes and cuts in state aid and to model what could have happened 
under alternative scenarios if the state chose not to freeze or cut state aid in the manner that it did. 
Measuring Equity of Inputs 
To examine equity of inputs, I used measures of both progressiveness and dispersion of 
funding. Progressiveness measures the relationship between poverty and levels of spending or 
revenue. For the purpose of this study, I used total current expenditures as the spending measure, 
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which does not include capital spending or debt service. For revenue, I used only state and local 
revenue because federal revenue is largely categorical in nature and intended to supplement rather 
than supplant state and local revenue. To measure dispersion of funding, I used the difference in 
funding between observed and predicted levels of funding based on student needs and district 
characteristics. 
To measure progressiveness, I used regression to identify the relationship between poverty 
and funding levels while controlling for other factors known to influence revenue and spending. The 
regression used a continuous quadratic measure of child poverty in addition to controlling for the 
proportion of special education students in a district, districts size, the population density in the 
geographic area of the district, and interaction between district size and population density, and an 
index measuring geographic differences in the cost of labor. This model is similar to a model used 
by Baker, Farrie, Johnson, Luhm & Sciarra (2017) in their yearly publication of the fairness of school 
funding. The progressiveness model is as follows: 
 
(1) Fundingdt = β0 + β1Povdt + β2Pov2dt + β3SpEddt + β4SpEd2dt + β5DistSizedt + β6PopDensitydt + 
β7PopDensity2dt + β8DistSizedt X PopDensitydt + β9LaborCostdt + ε  
 
where Fundingdt is the natural log of either per-pupil total current expenditures or combined state and 
local revenue for a given district in a given year; Povdt is the child poverty rate; SpEddt is the 
proportion of student receiving special education services; DistSizedt is a set of dummy variables 
indicating whether a district has less than 500, 500–2,000, 2,000–4,000, or more than 4,000 
students3; PopDensitydt is the natural log of the population density in the area where the school district 
is located; LaborCostdt is an index indicating the relative cost of labor for districts known as the 
Comparable Wage Index (CWI); and ε is the residual error term. All continuous variables were mean 
centered by state and year, which means the coefficient for poverty, β1, indicates how funding 
changes with respect to increases in poverty for districts with average child poverty rates. The 
coefficient for poverty squared, β2, indicates the amount of curvature in the relationship between 
poverty and funding. All regressions used were weighted by enrollment. Therefore, the coefficients 
can be interpreted as “for the average student.” Because the outcome variables were log 
transformed, regression coefficients can be interpreted as percentage, rather than dollar, changes or 
differences. 
To measure dispersion, I calculated the average of the absolute values of the residuals from 
the regression model indicated in equation 1. This calculation indicates the average distance between 
the actual levels of spending or revenue and the predicted values. Because the outcome variables are 
measured in log terms, this measure of dispersion can be thought of as a percentage difference. By 
accounting for the factors that influence revenue or spending contained in equation 1, this is a 
measure of the unexplained variation in resource levels across districts. In other words, this measure 
indicates how far (above or below) actual resource levels are from expected levels given the needs of 
their students and structural factors related to size and geographic location. Higher values indicate 
more dispersion, or larger average differences from expected resource levels. Another way to think 
about this measure of dispersion is as a measure of the predictability of resource distribution. Lower 
differences between observed and expected revenue levels mean that revenue is being distributed in 
a more predictable way based on the factors included in the regression model. However, it should be 
noted that the distribution of resources could be very predictable and distributed in a strongly 
 
3 Cutoffs for district size were based on the finding from Andrews, Duncombe & Yinger (2002) that districts 
with less than 500 students would realize cost savings by moving to a district with 2,000 to 4,000 students. 
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regressive fashion. Therefore, it is important to look at measures of both progressiveness and 
dispersion in tandem.4 
Conducting a Comparative Case Study Using Synthetic Controls 
In order to strengthen causal claims of the impact of the court cases on equity of inputs, I 
used a comparative quantitative case study approach to compare changes over time observed in 
New York to other states most suited to serve as a control case. In a comparative case study, the 
case that receives treatment is compared to a control case or set of control cases that do not receive 
treatment. Because there are potentially other factors that change over time, such as demographics 
or political attitudes, any change in outcome over time might not be attributable to the treatment. 
The use of a valid control case to serve as a counterfactual strengthens the argument that any 
observed differences in the posttreatment period between the treatment and control are due to the 
treatment. If the treatment and control case are a good match, we can assume that any change over 
time in the control case is what would have happened in the treatment case in the absence of 
treatment. Therefore, to conclude that the treatment had an impact, we would need to observe 
substantial divergence between the treatment and control case trends in the posttreatment period. 
However, the strength of causal inference depends on the selection of a valid control case that 
closely approximates what would have happened in the treatment group in the absence of treatment. 
One approach to comparative case studies is to select a control case that is theoretically 
similar to the treatment case. For example, Card & Krueger (1994) examined the impact of raising 
the minimum wage on employment in New Jersey using the neighboring state of Pennsylvania, 
which did not raise the minimum wage. However, in the absence of a strong theoretical comparison 
case, this approach could result in a poor choice of a comparison and is arguably based on the 
whims of the researcher. Instead of using a single state as the control case, I employed a “synthetic 
controls” approach as described in Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller (2010) and Abadie, Diamond 
& Hainmueller (2015) for selecting multiple states and averaging the characteristics from these states 
using weights to construct a single control case. The synthetic controls approach is a way to 
systematically determine which unit or units from a set of possible control units should be used to 
construct an appropriate comparison case. By using a computational approach to identify which 
units make up the comparison unit, I am able to objectively select the units making up the control 
case. The control units are selected and weighted to create a “synthetic” version of the unit of 
interest such that chosen pretreatment characteristics are as similar as possible to that of the 
treatment case. In the posttreatment period the “synthetic control” and treatment unit are allowed to 
vary and any differences in trends over time between the treatment and control unit in the 
posttreatment period are arguably caused by the treatment.5 
In this instance, the treatment unit was the State of New York, the treatment was the initial 
court ruling in 2003 overturning the education funding system in New York, and the possible 
control units were all other states not having education finance reform in the same period. Table 1 
shows the states excluded from the set of possible control units and the reasoning. The two possible 
 
4 Equation 1 represents the basic regression used in this study to measure equity within a single state and in a 
single year. To understand whether court-ordered finance reform had an impact on equity, I used the 
regression equation to estimate levels of equity in each year. Furthermore, to strengthen the study design, I 
compared changes in equity observed in New York to other states. This is further described in subsequent 
subsections. To make such comparisons I applied the regression specified in Equation 1 to data from each 
state in each year. 
5 To conduct the synthetic controls approach, I used the “synth” Stata package found at the following 
website: https://web.stanford.edu/~jhain/synthpage.html 
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reasons for excluding states were (a) if the state had a significant funding formula change or court-
case overturning the education funding system between 2000 and 2010, and (b) if the state had less 
than 20 school districts for any given year making the equity measures for the state less stable. 
Information on court-cases and legislated funding changes comes from Jackson et al. (2016) and 
National Education Access Network (2015). The court decision, which was handed down in 2003, 
allowed the state until June, 2004 to comply with the initial ruling; therefore, the treatment period 
begins with the 2004–05 school year. 
Synthetic controls allows users to specify pretreatment control variables and time periods. 
The outcomes for which I compared New York to “synthetic New York” are measures of 
progressiveness and dispersion, representing equity of inputs. Therefore, it was essential to control 
for those equity variables in the pretreatment time period. The equity variable being used as the 
independent variable was used as a control for the following years: 1995, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 
and 2004. By skipping some years in the earlier part of the time period and using the four years 
closest to when treatment occurred, I placed greater emphasis on years closer to treatment to ensure 
a close match between treatment and control in the period immediately prior to the initiation of the 
treatment. In addition to the equity variables, I also controlled for other factors likely to influence 
the degree of equity in states, such as student demographics, poverty rates, the proportion of 
districts in urban areas, and the proportion of revenue from local sources. For child poverty, 
proportion of Black and Hispanic students, proportion of students in urban districts, and percentage 
of revenue from local sources, I controlled for the average over the entire period as 2004 specifically 
to ensure that the synthetic control unit for 2004—the year immediately preceding treatment—was 
as similar as possible to the treatment unit. Table 2 displays the weights assigned to states making up 
“synthetic New York” for each outcome variable.6 In order to ensure “synthetic New York” was as 
similar as possible to actual New York for each outcome variable, I chose to estimate different 
weights for the synthetic control unit for each outcome variable. Therefore, the mixture and 




6 Only states included in the calculation of the synthetic control for at least one of the four outcome variables 
are included in the table. 
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Table 1 
List of States Excluded from the Pool of Potential Comparison States 
State Small N Funding change Year of change Cause of change 
Arizona No Yes 2007 Court-ordered 
Arkansas No Yes 2002, 2005 Court-ordered 
Delaware Yes No   
Hawaii Yes No   
Idaho No Yes 2005 Court-ordered 
Kansas No Yes 2005 Court-ordered 
Maine No Yes 2004 Legislative 
Maryland Yes Yes 2005 Court-ordered 
Montana No Yes 2005, 2008 Court-ordered 
Nevada Yes No   
New Hampshire No Yes 2002, 2006 Court-ordered 
North Carolina No Yes 2004 Court-ordered 
North Dakota No Yes 2007 Legislative 
Ohio No Yes 2002 Court-ordered 
Oregon No Yes 2009 Court-ordered 
Pennsylvania No Yes 2008 Legislative 
South Carolina No Yes 2005 Court-ordered 
Tennessee No Yes 2002 Court-ordered 
Texas No Yes 2004 Court-ordered 
Vermont No Yes 2003 Legislative 
Washington No Yes 2007 Court-ordered 
Wyoming No Yes 2001 Court-ordered 
 
Although the approach to funding schools and level of equity varies in the individual states 
included in the calculation of the synthetic control, when combined according to the specified 
weights, the resulting synthetic control for New York closely approximates levels of equity in New 
York in the decade preceding treatment. The lack of theoretical similarity for some of the states 
chosen to be part of the control is in many ways expected, since the synthetic controls approach 
selects and weights states from the set of possible control units empirically rather than theoretically. 
Despite potential theoretical qualms regarding the inclusion of certain states, the close match 
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between New York and its synthetic counterpart over the entirety of the pretreatment period 
strengthens the assumption that the synthetic control represents an appropriate counterfactual for 
what would have happened in New York during the posttreatment period.7 
 
Table 2 
Weights for States Making Up Synthetic New York for Measures of Progressiveness and Dispersion 
 Progressiveness Weights Dispersion Weights 
 Spending Revenue Spending Revenue 
AK 0.015 0.008 - - 
CA - 0.233 0.014 0.009 
CO - - - 0.089 
CT 0.111 0.039 - - 
FL - - 0.304 0.070 
IL 0.223 0.267 0.198 0.078 
LA 0.119 - - - 
MA - 0.148 - - 
MS - 0.193 - 0.234 
MO - - - 0.077 
NE - - 0.033 - 
NJ 0.050 - - - 
NM 0.217 - 0.094 0.246 
RI - 0.084 0.095 - 
SD - 0.029 - 0.107 
VA 0.237 - 0.262 0.065 
WV 0.029 - - 0.025 
 
Because the synthetic controls method only compares one treatment unit to one control unit 
standard errors cannot be computed to determine statistical significance. To better understand the 
magnitude of the differences between New York and “synthetic New York,” I performed a series of 
 
7 While the strong match in the pretreatment period increases confidence in the method, there is no way to 
determine whether the posttreatment trends of the synthetic control are an accurate representation of what 
would have happened in New York in the absence of finance reform. Therefore, I also examined how equity 
would have changed using simulations of alternative implementation scenarios, described subsequently. 
Together, these two approaches make for compelling causal evidence of the impact of finance reform in New 
York. 
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placebo tests. For these placebo tests I generated a synthetic version for every state that was in the 
pool of possible control states. Because states identified to serve as a possible control case for New 
York did not have education finance reform between 2000 and 2010, large differences between 
those states and their synthetic version are not expected. If changes in New York relative to its 
control are indeed remarkable, they should be as large or larger than 95% of the placebo tests. To 
examine whether the differences seen over time between New York and “synthetic New York” were 
larger than those seen between other states and their synthetic counterpart, I graphed the differences 
between actual and synthetic for all states including New York.8 If New York diverges more than 
other states from the synthetic control after the treatment time period, that is a good indicator the 
differences in New York are not random and are due to policy changes after treatment. 
Measuring the Impact of Freezes and Cuts to State Aid 
To examine how progressiveness and dispersion of funding would have changed over time 
had the freezes and cuts to state aid not occurred, I calculated expected values of combined state 
and local revenue had the following scenarios taken place rather than what was observed: (a) no 
freezes to foundation aid occurred, but additional cuts known as the gap elimination adjustments 
still happened as observed; (b) neither freezes to foundation aid nor additional cuts to state aid 
occurred; and (c) neither freezes to foundation aid nor other state aid cuts occurred and local effort 
rates remained constant after 2009 at levels observed in school years ending in 2008 and 2009. 
As previously described, due to the Great Recession, the legislated increases to state aid were 
placed on hold beginning in the 2009–10 school year and additional cuts, known as the Gap 
Elimination Adjustment occurred in the following school year. The New York State Education 
Department generates publicly available information on how much each district was intended to 
receive under the foundation aid formula and how much they were actually allotted in foundation 
aid. To estimate the amount of combined state and local revenue districts would have received had 
the formula been enacted as planned without freezes or additional cuts, I calculated the difference in 
proposed foundation aid and the actual amount received and added this difference to each district's 
observed levels of combined state and local revenue. Between 100 and 200 of New York’s districts 
received more in foundation aid than the formula indicated in any given year, due to hold harmless 
provisions not allowing state aid to decrease. For these districts, I did not add or subtract anything 
from their state and local revenue. In other words, I left the hold harmless provision in place. 
Because these districts tended to have relatively small enrollment, the choice to not deduct excess 
revenue did not appreciably change the results. 
Adding the state revenue districts would have received in the absence of freezes or cuts 
should result in improved progressiveness and reduced dispersion of the distribution of revenue. 
However, any improvements are likely to be conservative compared to what would have happened 
had the formula been enacted as proposed and had cuts not occurred. This is because districts 
responded to cuts in state aid by increasing local revenue. Chakrabarti et al. (2014) indicates 
wealthier districts were able to increase local revenue more than poorer districts during this time, 
exacerbating inequity. To account for the possibility that districts differentially responded to cuts in 
state aid by increasing locally raised revenue, I calculated the amount of local revenue districts would 
have received had their local effort remained at levels observed prior to the 2009–10 school year and 
substituted this amount of local revenue for the observed amount. The local effort rate is defined as 
 
8 One placebo state, Alaska, had sufficiently poor fit with its synthetic control that I chose to not include it in 
the graphs presented in the results section. 
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local revenue divided by district property values. In the previously described calculation, I used the 
average local effort rate of the 2007–08 and 2008–09 school years as the pre-freeze rate. 
Measuring Changes in Equity When Using STAR Revenue to Offset Foundation Aid 
Freezes 
The decision to freeze foundation aid was a political choice. One possible alternative to 
freezing foundation aid could have been to not pay out STAR, the state's property tax relief. To 
better understand how this alternative could have impacted equity levels, I calculated the amount of 
state and local revenue districts would have received under different scenarios after 2009 when 
freezes and cuts occurred. The three scenarios used were: (a) if there was no STAR revenue and 
freezes and cuts to foundation aid still occurred; (b) if 50% of STAR revenue was redistributed 
according to the foundation aid deficit while 50% of STAR remained distributed the same manner 
as existing STAR allocations; and (c) if 100% of STAR revenue was redistributed according to the 
foundation deficit. 
To calculate the amount of state and local revenue districts would have received in the 
absence of STAR, I simply subtracted the amount of STAR revenue from the observed combined 
state and local revenue total for each district. To simulate the redistribution of STAR revenue 
according to the foundation deficit, I calculated the share of the overall foundation aid deficit borne 
by each district and multiplied the total amount of STAR revenue to be redistributed by each 
district's share of the foundation aid deficit. For the scenario where 50% of STAR was redistributed, 
I removed half of each district's existing STAR revenue allotment, totaled the STAR revenue 
recouped from districts, and redistributed that amount according to district shares of the foundation 
aid deficit. For the scenario were 100% of STAR was redistributed, the entire allotment of STAR 
was deducted from each district, totaled, and doled out according to districts’ foundation aid deficit 
share. Following the calculation of state and local revenue under these scenarios, I calculated 
progressiveness and dispersion measures as previously described. 
Data 
For national data on district-level expenditures and district-level student demographics I 
used the National Center for Education Statistics' (NCES) Common Core of Data (CCD) database. 
I supplemented the CCD data on spending and revenue was with more detailed data on revenue 
from the New York State Education Department. I also received additional data from the State Aid 
Office at the New York State Education Department. The data from the New York State Education 
Department included district-level variables on the amount of foundation aid paid to districts, the 
amount of foundation aid districts should have received under the foundation formula, the amount 
of funding cut through the gap elimination adjustment, the amount of revenue distributed through 
the STAR program, and the local effort rate. 
To account for differences in regional costs for providing education, I used the Comparable 
Wage Index (CWI) originally published by NCES and updated by Lori Taylor of Texas A&M 
University. Lastly, I adjusted dollar figures for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Results 
In this section I present the result from the synthetic controls approach to comparative case 
studies as well as simulations showing what could have happened under alternative scenarios. The 
use of the synthetic control provides a baseline or anchor by which to compare the changes 
observed in New York over time. In order to say that education finance reform resulting from the 
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two court cases has caused changes in levels of equity of inputs, any observed changes in New York 
must be exceptional compared to states not having similar education finance reform. Following the 
presentation of the synthetic controls results I present results from a series of simulations examining 
how equity could have changed had freezes and cuts to state aid not occurred or were made to 
STAR rather than foundation aid. By showing how equity would have changed in these alternative 
scenarios, I am better able to pinpoint the freezes and cuts to state aid as a main contributor to the 
observed patterns of change in equity over time in New York. 
Changes in Progressiveness 
Figure 1 compares the relationship between poverty and funding in New York to its 
synthetic version for each year included in the study. In this subsection, the relationship between 
poverty and spending or revenue is the measure of progressiveness and can be interpreted as the 
percent change in spending or revenue for a one percentage point change in poverty. For example, 
in the left panel of Figure 1, the relationship of -0.2 in 1995 indicates that a one percentage point 
increase in poverty across districts results in a 0.2% decrease in spending. In each graph the two 
vertical lines represent the earliest point that CFE I and then CFE II and the resulting funding 
reform (the Act) could have had an impact on equity of resource distribution. 
 
 
Figure 1. Progressiveness of the distribution of spending and revenue over time in New York and 
synthetic New York. 
 
From 1995 to 2007 progressiveness of funding appears to have changed little over time, 
hovering at -0.2 for spending and -0.4 for state and local revenue. In 2008 and 2009, there appeared 
to be some marked improvement in progressiveness. In fact, progressiveness measured by spending 
briefly entered positive territory in 2009. The brief period of improvement aligns with the timing of 
the legislation passed creating a new foundation formula-based funding system and the phasing in of 
foundation aid increases in the 2007–08 and 2008–09 school years, prior to the imposition of freezes 
and cuts starting in the 2009–10 school year. The improvements in progressiveness were halted with 
the great recession and the subsequent freezes and cuts. By 2013, measures of progressiveness using 
spending were back at pre-legislation levels. Progressiveness measured using revenue also showed a 
backslide from the peak levels observed in 2009. 
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When comparing levels of progressiveness in New York to other states represented by 
“synthetic New York,” the differences during the pretreatment period—prior to 2004—are quite 
small, indicating good fit between New York and synthetic New York. In the posttreatment period, 
there is some divergence between New York and synthetic New York. For progressiveness 
measured using spending, it appears synthetic New York was consistently more equitable than New 
York in the posttreatment period. The differences in progressiveness emerge beginning in 2005 and 
2006—prior to the finance legislation New York ultimately passed in 2007—and persisted through 
the remaining years. Notably, even though equity in New York improved in 2008 and 2009 
following the passage of the finance legislation, the gap between New York and its synthetic control 
was not eliminated. For progressiveness using state and local revenue, New York appears to have 
higher levels of equity in the posttreatment period compared to the synthetic version. These 
differences emerged after New York's legislative finance reform, potentially indicating improvement 
resulting from this effort. 
As an additional test to better understand the magnitude of differences between New York 
and its synthetic counterpart, I conducted placebo tests by creating a synthetic version for all the 
states used in the pool of potential controls for New York. Figure 2 shows the results of these 
placebo tests for progressiveness. In each of the graphs, the black line shows the difference between 
New York and its synthetic control and each lighter gray line depicts the difference between one of 
the states in the pool of controls for New York and its synthetic version. Differences were 
calculated by simply subtracting measures of progressiveness for the actual state from the synthetic 
version of that state. As designed, prior to the treatment period the differences between the actual 
and synthetic versions of the states generally hover close to zero other than a few cases of poor 
pretreatment fit. After the treatment period the differences start to wander away from zero in many 
placebo states, with differences in some states drifting further from zero than others. Because there 
are no identified reasons for these placebo states to diverge from their synthetic version the 
differences are assumed to be random. Therefore, to confidently say that differences seen between 
New York and its synthetic version are not due to randomness, the divergence in New York should 
be, at minimum, toward the outer extremities of differences seen in the placebo states, and ideally 
larger than the largest placebo difference. 
For progressiveness measured using both spending and revenue, the differences seen in New 
York fall firmly within the range of outcomes seen in the placebo states. In the left-hand panel of 
figure 2, the difference between New York and its synthetic counterpart is consistently negative in 
the post-CFE-I period; however, a substantial number of placebo states had negative differences of 
larger magnitude than that seen in New York. This indicates that any observed differences observed 
between New York and its synthetic control could have been due to random chance rather than 
impacts from the policy changes in New York. Likewise, when using revenue to measure 
progressiveness (the righthand panel of figure 2), the difference between New York and synthetic 
New York is not exceptional. These results provide no evidence that progressiveness of funding in 
New York substantially changed as a result of the CFE v. New York court cases. 
 
  




Figure 2. Comparison of progressiveness in New York and synthetic New York with placebo tests 
for other states. 
 
Changes in Dispersion 
Figure 3 shows graphs of dispersion—represented by the average difference in absolute 
terms between observed and expected levels of spending or revenue—for both New York and its 
synthetic version using spending and revenue. Smaller differences signal less (better) dispersion. 
Using both spending and revenue, dispersion improved in the pretreatment period from 1996 to the 
early 2000s. Beginning in the early to mid-2000s, prior to CFE I, dispersion began to increase 




Figure 3. Dispersion of the distribution spending and revenue in New York and synthetic New York 
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Comparing New York to its synthetic control, there appear to be few sustained differences 
in the posttreatment period. Figure 4 shows the graphs of placebo tests similar to those performed 
for measures of progressiveness. As described earlier, to argue the differences seen between New 
York and its synthetic case are not due to randomness they should be larger than those seen in the 
placebo tests. For both spending and revenue, the differences seen between New York and its 
synthetic version fall well within the range of differences shown in the placebo tests, indicating that 
any changes to dispersion of funding in New York relative to the synthetic case could be due to 
randomness rather than changes to fiscal policy. These results provide no indication that levels of 
dispersion systemically improved in New York as a result of the CFE v. New York court cases and 
the subsequent education finance reforms. 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of dispersion in New York and synthetic New York with placebo tests 
for other states. 
 
The Impact of Freezes and Cuts to State Aid 
Freezes and cuts to state aid had two potential consequences to the amount of revenue 
districts received. First, and most directly, districts received less in the form of state aid through the 
foundation aid formula which adjusts for student needs. These foundation aid freezes and cuts 
disproportionately impacted high poverty districts. As shown in the top left panel of figure 5, the 
foundation aid deficit—the amount by which school districts were underfunded on the basis of 
foundation aid freezes—was strongly related to district poverty rates for each school year ending in 
2010 to 2014. For instance, in 2014 the lowest poverty districts had foundation aid deficits well 
under $1,000 per student while the deficits in the highest poverty districts approached $4,000 per 
student. 
The second possible impact of freezes and cuts to state aid was that school districts 
increased their rates of local taxation to make up for lost state revenue (Chakrabarti et al., 2014). The 
top right panel of figure 5 shows that between 2009 and 2015 local effort rates increased from 
around 15% for a district with average poverty levels to 20%. While there does not appear to be a 
strong relationship between child poverty rates and local effort of districts, in 2013 and 2015 lower 
poverty districts generally had higher rates of local effort than higher poverty districts. Across the 
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range of poverty levels, districts on average increased their rates of local taxation from 2009 to 2015. 
Even if low and high poverty districts increased their local effort equivalently, low poverty districts 
would raise more local revenue per student because of higher property wealth. Therefore, the 
increased reliance on revenue from local sources resulting from cuts to state revenue potentially 
exacerbated inequity of inputs. 
The bottom left panel of figure 5 shows that the freezes to foundation aid had substantial 
impacts on levels of progressiveness. Observed levels of progressiveness measured using revenue in 
New York declined slightly after 2009. In contrast, in the absence of foundation aid freezes 
progressiveness of the distribution of funding continued to improve. By 2015 the difference 
between the observed relationship and the measured relationship in the scenario with no foundation 
aid freezes was approximately 0.4, meaning that a one percentage point increase in district poverty 
rates resulted in 0.4 percentage points more revenue in the scenario with no freezes compared to 
what was observed. The scenario with no freezes and no cuts does not result in measures of 
progressiveness that are meaningfully different from the scenario with only no freezes, meaning that 
the additional cuts to state aid above the foundation aid freezes did not differentially impact districts 
on the basis of poverty rates. 
 
 
Figure 5. Impact of foundation aid freezes and other state aid cuts on equity of combined state and 
local revenue. 
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The results for the third scenario, which calculates revenue levels had freezes and cuts not 
occurred and local effort remained at levels observed prior to the freezes and cuts, show dramatic 
increases in progressiveness. The increased reliance on local revenue, potentially resulting from state 
aid cuts, also impacted levels of progressiveness. The difference in progressiveness between this 
scenario and observed measures by 2015 was approximately 0.8, meaning a one percentage point 
increase in poverty rates across districts would have resulted in a 0.8 percentage point increase in 
spending relative to what was observed. The results of the scenario where freezes and cuts did not 
occur, and local effort remained the same indicates that by 2015 districts with higher poverty rates 
would have received substantially more revenue than those with lower poverty rates. A district with 
a one percentage point higher poverty rate would have received 0.6% more revenue in 2015. In 
contrast, the observed relationship between poverty and revenue indicates that one percentage point 
increases in poverty across districts resulted in 0.2% less revenue. 
The results of spending cuts and freezes on dispersion of funding are equally striking, 
indicating that freezes, cuts, and increased reliance on local revenue all played a part in generating 
larger differences between observed and expected levels of revenue. As seen in the bottom right 
panel of figure 5, had freezes to foundation aid not occurred, average differences between observed 
and expected revenue levels would have been slightly smaller. Had the additional cuts, known as the 
Gap Elimination Adjustment, and freezes not occurred between 2011 and 2015, levels of dispersion 
would have been reduced by 0.5 to 1.0 percentage points depending on the year. And finally, the 
increased reliance on local property taxes resulting from freezes and cuts to state aid, severely 
impacted the potential reduction in the dispersion of funding. Had freezes and cuts not occurred, 
and levels of local effort remained constant, average differences between observed and expected 
revenue would have decreased by more than 1.5 percentage points by 2015. This means that 
unobserved variation in spending would have been reduced and revenue levels received by districts 
would have been more strongly dependent on student needs and district structural factors related to 
costs. Districts with similar characteristics would have received more similar amounts of revenue on 
average had the freezes and cuts not occurred at the time of the Great Recession. 
These findings indicate that the design of the education finance reform in New York, had it 
been fully implemented, would have resulted in substantially improved progressiveness—as 
measured by the relationship between poverty and revenue—and dispersion—as measured by the 
average difference between observed and expected revenue levels. 
Simulating the Use of STAR Revenue to Fund Foundation Aid Deficits 
The decision to freeze foundation aid during the Great Recession was a political choice. To 
provide an example of what could have happened to equity had a different choice been made, I 
show how redistributing STAR revenue to at least partially cover the foundation aid deficit would 
have impacted equity. As described in Chakrabarti et al. (2014), STAR revenue is regressively 
distributed with respect to poverty. I find a similarly regressive distribution of STAR between 2000 
and 2015. Since 2005, the lowest poverty districts received over $2,000 of STAR revenue per 
student, whereas districts with the highest poverty rates received around $500 per student, shown in 
the top left panel of figure 6. Since 2005, the relationship between poverty rates and STAR has 
remained quite constant over time. 
Mirroring the relationship between STAR and poverty is the relationship between STAR and 
local revenue. Those districts able to generate the most local revenue also receive the most STAR. 
As shown in the top right panel of figure 6, districts raising only $2,000 per student in local revenue 
received between $500 and $700 per student in STAR on average from 2005 to 2015, while those 
raising $14,000 per student locally received between $1,000 and $1,500 per student in STAR in most 
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years. As one of the primary functions of state aid is usually to offset the inequitable distribution of 
local revenue, that STAR reinforces inequity across localities is particularly troublesome. 
To examine how equity would have changed had STAR been cut rather than freezing 
foundation aid, I calculated the amount of combined state and local revenue districts would have 
received under the following three scenarios, and measured progressiveness and dispersion under 
each scenario: (a) STAR revenue was removed completely as if the STAR program did not exist; (b) 
STAR was funded at half of its level for each year and the revenue saved by decreasing STAR was 
distributed according to each district's share of the foundation aid deficit; and (c) STAR was not 
funded and the revenue savings were distributed according to the foundation aid deficit. 
 
Figure 6. Impact of STAR on equity of combined state and local revenue. 
 
The results of these simulations indicate progressiveness would have improved in the 
absence of STAR and would have improved further if the revenue used to fund STAR was used to 
fund the foundation aid deficit. In 2015, STAR revenue per student amounted to approximately 
$1,300 statewide. The foundation aid deficit per student was just over $1,900 per student statewide, 
meaning that STAR revenue could have funded two-thirds of the shortfall in foundation aid. The 
reallocation of STAR revenue to foundation aid improves equity through both getting rid of a 
regressively distributed revenue stream and increasing levels of funding devoted to foundation aid—
a progressive funding stream. As shown in the bottom left panel of figure 6, if only half of STAR 
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was reallocated to fund foundation aid, the distribution of state and local revenue would have been 
neutral rather than regressive. Redistributing all of STAR revenue to fund foundation aid improved 
the relationship between poverty and revenue from -0.2 to 0.3 in 2015, an improvement of 0.5, 
indicating with a one percentage point increase in poverty across districts would have resulted in 
0.5% more revenue than what was observed. 
As an example of the impact of STAR on progressiveness of funding, in 2015 the observed 
relationship between poverty and revenue for New York was -0.2, meaning that for a district with 
average poverty rates, a one percentage point increase in the poverty rate would result in 0.2% less 
state and local revenue. Under the scenario where STAR revenue is removed completely or where 
half of STAR revenue is redistributed according to the distribution of non-STAR revenue, the 
relationship improved to be almost neutral. When all of STAR revenue is redistributed the 
relationship improved to be positive at 0.3. To give some context to these numbers, for a district of 
5,000 students and assuming average state and local revenue per student of $15,000, under the 
observed relationship, a one percentage point increase in the child poverty rate would result in 
$150,000 less in spending on average, whereas in the scenario where all STAR revenue is 
redistributed the result would be $225,000 more, a difference of $375,000. 
Redistributing STAR had much smaller impacts on dispersion of funding, as shown in the 
bottom right panel of figure 6. Measures of dispersion when withholding STAR revenue were 
slightly worse than observed values. This is likely due to the strong negative relationship between 
STAR and poverty. STAR is distributed in a very predictable way, meaning that districts get what 
they are expected to get; but it is predictable in a very regressive way. So, removing STAR revenue 
improves progressiveness of revenue distribution but increases dispersion. Redistributing STAR 
revenue to fund the foundation aid deficit had little impact on dispersion since a predictable 
regressive revenue source was replaced by a similarly predictable progressive distribution of funding. 
Summary and Conclusion 
The CFE v. New York court cases were intended to improve the adequacy and fairness of 
funding education in New York. The courts concluded that significant increases in revenue from the 
state were needed to address the insufficient provision of education, particularly in New York City, 
but in other parts of the state as well. Because of the court cases, comprehensive education finance 
reform legislation was enacted in 2007 and first implemented in the 2007–08 school year. Soon after, 
however, the Great Recession occurred resulting in freezes and cuts to state aid and increased 
reliance on local revenue. 
Summary of Main Findings 
The findings herein indicate that the court cases did not result in more equitable funding 
across districts as measured by progressiveness and dispersion of funding. Districts serving larger 
shares of poor students have continued to receive less revenue and spend less than those with higher 
income student populations. Additionally, reductions in the difference between observed and 
expected levels of resources did not occur. The trends in equity levels seen over time in the State of 
New York after the CFE v. New York court cases show no signs of diverging from equity trends 
seen in other comparable states that did not undergo similar finance reform. This indicates changes 
in levels of equity seen in New York were not exceptional, leading to the conclusion that CFE v. 
New York and the subsequently legislated funding reform had no substantive impact on the degree 
of equity within New York. 
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To examine whether the lack of impact was due to poor design or lack of implementation of 
the legislated finance reform, I conducted several simulations to estimate the effect of finance 
reform on equity levels had the reform been implemented as intended. These results show that both 
progressiveness and dispersion would have improved drastically if the reform was fully 
implemented, resulting in districts with high proportions of poor students receiving more funding 
than their less disadvantaged counterparts and resulting in more predictable funding based on the 
needs of students and the characteristics of the districts that serve them. 
As a final exercise, I examined how equity would have changed had the state chosen to make 
cuts to STAR rather than freeze foundation aid. Under the STAR system, local property taxes are 
reduced, and state funding is used to make up for lost revenue to school districts. The system 
provides the least amount of revenue to the districts with the highest amounts of poverty. If the 
amount of revenue currently allocated to STAR was instead used to fund foundation aid to make up 
for the deficits caused by the freezes, progressiveness of the distribution of funding would have 
improved substantially. These results demonstrate that the state’s lack of commitment to equity 
ultimately doomed the state’s efforts to finance a more adequate and equitable education system. To 
maintain the equitable funding of schools in times of fiscal constraint, rather than underfund 
foundation aid, the state could have made cuts to other pieces of state aid that are less critical to 
maintaining and improving equity. 
Implications and Future Research 
The ultimate goal of improving the funding of schools is to create a system that provides 
equal opportunities for successful outcomes to all students. Education is the springboard for upward 
mobility that enables students from impoverished backgrounds to improve their future quality of life 
and ability to make contributions to society socially and economically. However, recent studies have 
shown that gaps in student outcomes and educational attainment are growing, or at least persisting, 
and upward mobility in the United States has stalled (Bailey & Dynarski, 2011; Hout, 2018; Reardon, 
2011). It is also the case that studies have demonstrated that court-ordered or legislatively initiated 
education finance reform can have substantial impacts on improving equity of inputs and 
subsequently outcomes, particularly for students from disadvantaged situations (Jackson et al., 2016; 
Johnson & Tanner, 2018; Lafortune, Rothstein & Schanzenbach, 2016). This measured impact, 
however, depends upon the reforms having the intended proximal outcome of distributing more 
funding to districts and schools with the most need—namely those with large numbers of 
economically disadvantaged students. Given that there was little to no change in equity of inputs 
demonstrated in New York, the finance reform resulting from the CFE v. New York court cases 
likely had no impact on the goal of creating an adequate education system that provides all students 
an equal opportunity to learn. The good news for New York is that a complete overhaul to their 
system of education funding is unwarranted. The state simply needs to fully fund the existing 
foundation aid formula. Fully two-thirds of the dollars needed to fund the foundation aid formula 
could simply be reallocated from the state's system of property tax relief, a component of state aid 
that disproportionately benefits the advantaged. 
In addition to providing some specific suggestions for how education finance in New York 
might be improved, the presented findings serve as an example for other states that are planning to 
reform their system of funding elementary and secondary education. A court case overturning an 
education finance system is not enough on its own to create a more equitable system. In the case of 
New York, legislating a new funding formula to more progressively distribute dollars was also not 
enough to create sustained progress toward a more equitable funding system. Legislation of 
education finance formulas are easily derailed through lack of appropriation, as in the case of New 
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York. It takes sustained commitment and the often politically difficult choice to prioritize equity to 
sustain funding reforms which ultimately lead to fairer distribution of education revenue and more 
equal student outcomes. 
This study also highlights the challenges economic downturns pose to creating an equitable 
education funding system. Baker (2018) notes that the Great Recession had a negative impact on the 
progressiveness of funding in several states that are well known to have a relatively progressive 
system of funding, such as Massachusetts and New Jersey. This study makes the case that freezes 
and cuts to foundation aid and subsequent increases in local revenue are to blame for the lack of 
improvement in progressiveness in New York. Further examination of how and why the Great 
Recession impacted progressiveness of school finance in other states would further contribute to the 
body of knowledge surrounding the funding of schools in times of fiscal constraints and how states 
could make better choices to maintain a fair system of funding during and after economic 
downturns. 
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